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A. The general theme of this conference is efficiency
in water use. Although I have no argument with the
various definitions of economic efficiency, many of
which will undoubtedly be discussed at this
conference, for the economically ignorant, like
myself, the following quote captures the essence of
efficiency. "What we are seeking to do and must do
in a civilized society is to adjust relations and
order conduct in a world in which the goods of
existence, the scope of free activity and the
objects on which to exert free activity are
limited, and the demands on those goods and those
objects are infinite. To order the activities of
men in their endeavors to satisfy their demands so
as to enable satisfaction of as much of the whole
scheme of demands with the least friction and waste
has * * * been what law makers and tribunals and
jurists have been striving for." Roscoe Pound, ME
Philosophy of Law (1941).
B. In a large sense the basic theme of the
appropriation doctrine has been efficiency. A few
examples are illustrative:
1. The acceptance of the appropriation doctrine
by the Supreme Court of California in Irwin v.
_
Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855), the first case to
judicially apply the doctrine, occurred
because the common law doctrine of riparian
rights inhibited the use of water for the most
important purpose of the day - the mining of
gold.
2. Similarly, in rejecting completely the
riparian doctrine in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch 
Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882), the Colorado Supreme
Court said, "To apply the rule contended for
[a watershed limitation] would prevent the
useful and profitable cultivation of the
productive soil, and sanction the waste of
water upon the more sterile lands."
3. The concept of "beneficial use," so central to
the appropriation doctrine, is essentially an
efficiency principle.
4. The "duty of water" concept, which limits the
quantity of water to which an irrigator is
entitled is directed toward efficiency. In
effect, the duty concept says that a
reasonably efficient irrigator can make do
with a particular quantity of water.
C. The foregoing is not meant to suggest that the
appropriation doctrine is a perfect mechanism for
the efficient allocation of water. Some economists
have been highly critical of the doctrine itself.
See, e.g., Johnson, An Optimal State Water Law:
Fixed Water Rights and Flexible Market Prices, 57
Va. L. Rev. 345 (1971); Gaffney, Economic Aspects
of Water Resources Policy, 28 Am. J. Econ. and
Sociology 131 (1969). Other writers have been
critical of various rules which discourage
efficient use of water, and have even attacked such
concepts as beneficial use and duty of water as
producing inefficient results in practice. See,
e.g., Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A
Blueprint for Change, 61 Ore L. Rev. 483 (1982);
Pring and Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barriers to
Conservation and Efficient Use of Water in the
West, 25 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 25-1
(1979). Nevertheless, the fundamental movement in
the appropriation doctrine has been in the
direction of efficiency as Dean Pound might have
defined that term, that is, "to enable satisfaction
of as much of the whole scheme of demands with the
least friction and waste."
D. A great deal has already been written about
efficiency and the appropriation doctrine. Much of
it is good, but some of seem beside the point. I
believe that two common reasons are responsible:
1. Ignoring or failing to comprehend the
physical realities of the water resource and
water use.
2. Ignoring the present state of the law. We
no longer write on a clean slate. It is quite
possible that one might design a more
efficient system of allocation if starting
anew. But rights have vested and expectations
have developed on the current state of the
law.
1. I will give one example. Several writers have
suggested that many, if not most, of the legal
impediments to the transfer of water rights
can be removed by simply defining the right in
terms of consumption. That is, the license or
permit should specify a consumptive
entitlement which could be transferred
freely. In addition to ignoring a number of
potential third party effects not internalized
by defining water rights in terms of
consumption, this suggestion ignores the fact
that overwhelming majority of water rights are
not presently defined in terms of
consumption. The cost of determining the
consumption of all existing rights would be
enormously expensive. Further, it would be
wasteful because many of the rights would
never be transferred. Little would be gained
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by defining new rights in terms of consumption
because new rights are unlikely to be a
candidate for transfer. Thus, I find that the
suggestion contributes little to efforts to
improve transferability.
E. It is my thesis that a realistic understanding of
the resource and the law is an essential foundation
for any discussion of efficiency. Thus, what I
shall try to do is outline the physical attributes
of the resource and the legal principles of the
appropriation doctrine which must be considered in
any discussion of efficiency.
1. Laws, of course, can be changed. However,
"vested rights" and considerations of
fairness, which are really one and the same,
to say nothing of political realities, impose
some limitations.
2. A minor thesis, if I have one, is that most of
the major rules of the appropriation doctrine
make sense (even economic sense) if considered
in light of the circumstances which existed at
their adoption.
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II. THE WATER RESOURCE AND WATER USE
A. The Water Resource
1. Western stream are highly variable, both from
season to season and from year to year. As
one (eastern) court so aptly put it:
"According to nature water does not flow in
any stream by averages, but flows by
extremes." Sturtevant v. Ford, 280 Mass 303,
182 NE 560, 564 (1932).
a. Regulation (storage) moderates this
phenomenon but does not eliminate it.
2. Streams are a "flow" resource. That is, water
is provided in a flow which must be captured
and used now or it is lost (to the ocean or a
downstream state, which is even worse).
a. Again, storage moderates but does not
eliminate this phenomenon.
3. Streams are a highly interrelated resource.
Unlike land, it is difficult to package
streams into relatively discrete bundles of
rights so that each owner knows where his
"property" begins and ends. Withdrawal and
use of water at one point one a stream has a
direct effect on its use at other points.
4. Information about the resource is often less
than complete. In the early years of the
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doctrine this was particularly so. To
extensive hydrologic data is available.
Nevertheless, there are frequently gaps in
information. Some examples:
1. The Colorado River Compact was
adopted on the assumption that the long-
term average flow of the Colorado River
was 16.5 million acre-feet it now appears
that the figure is only 13.5 million
acre-feet. See, Kneese and Bonem,
"Hypothetical Shocks to Water Allocation
Institutions in the Colorado Basin," New
Courses for the Colorado River 89-91
(Eds. Weatherford and Brown 1986).
2. Return flows, particularly from
irrigated agriculture, are important in
determining third party effects (injury
to other appropriators) in the transfer
of water rights, yet little actual study
of return flows has been made. The
general assumption seems to be that any
water not consumed in the growing of
plants (evapotranspiration) returns to
the stream, but the validity of the
assumption has generally not been tested.
3. Similarly, stream conveyance losses
can be important in calculating third
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party effects in the transfer of water
rights, but information on such losses in
not available for most streams.
B. Water Use
1. Most uses of water are not entirely
consumptive. That is, in most cases some or
all of the water withdrawn returns to the
system from which it is withdrawn and is
available for reuse. This is particularly
true of irrigation uses, in which return flows
of 50% are frequently assumed. This
phenomenon exacerbates the interrelated nature
of the resource; one person's return flow is
another person's supply.
2. The use of water involves large capital
expenditures for storage, diversion, and
transportation facilities.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
A. Origin
1. "Appropriate *** 2. To take possession of or
make use of exclusively for oneself, often
without permission." The American Heritage
Dictionary (1971). This definition accurately
describes the appropriation doctrine in its
-8
initial stage during the California gold
rush. Title to the land on which the gold
rush occurred and to the gold which was mined
was in the United States. Until 1866, the
miners took the gold, and the water they
needed to mine it, "without permission." At
this stage the doctrine was one of possession;
the right was created by taking possession of
the stream or a portion of its flow. See
Wiel, Water Rights in the Western United
States	 476 (3rd ed. 1911).
2. Consequences:
a. Temporal priority became the rule of
allocation. This is, of course, a basic
principle of possessory rights; the first
person to take possession has the better
right.
(1) Priority provides a mechanism for
adjusting demand to a supply which
is highly variable.
b. b. Water rights were freed from the
land. Unlike the riparian doctrine, in
which water rights are an incident of
land ownership, appropriative rights
became independent property rights
created by taking possession of the
water. Water use was no longer
restricted to riparian lands.
c. As independent property rights, water
rights became transferable interests;
that is, the place of use and purpose of
use could be changed. See Wiel, supra,
496.
(1) Some states have enacted statutes
restricting changes in use.
However, these restrictions are
really quite limited in number and
scope. See Gould, Conversion of
Agricultural Water Rights to
Industrial Use, 27 Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute, 1791, 1803-
1816 (1982).
3. The allocation scheme of the doctrine at this
point is quite simple; streams are divided up
by disposing of their flows in appropriated
shares.
a. Physical realities complicate this
seemingly simple allocation scheme
somewhat. Many western streams are
"losing" streams; consequently, the
quantity of water available for diversion
is greater at higher elevations than at
lower ones. Thus, at any point of time a
such a stream is capable of satisfying a
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r	 greater or lesser number of shares
depending on where diversions occur. In
fact, Wiel doubted the capacity of the
appropriation doctrine to adequately
resolve this problem, which he called
"the battle of the levels." Wiel, Fifty
Years of Water Law, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 252
(1936).
B. Beneficial use
1. Beneficial use quickly replaced possession
(diversion) as the basis of the water right.
See Wiel, supra § 478. Beneficial use remains
r	
the linchpin of the doctrine today. E.g.,
"Beneficial use shall be the basis, measure
and limit of the use of water." Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 45-131. Virtually identical
pronouncements are made in the statutes of a
number of other states.
2. Consequences. A number of consequences flow
from the shift from possession to beneficial
use as the basis of the appropriative right.
However, two seem of particular importance
with regard to efficiency.
a. The parameters of the right are measured
r`	 by the beneficial use to which the water
is put rather than by diversion.
Although the right remains transferable,
the initial specific use, becomes the
basis, measure, and limit of the
right.	 As Wiel put it, there has been a
change from a possessory system to a
specific purpose system. Supra § 476.
Some early courts carried this to the
extreme of limiting the right by the
idiosyncratic habits of the initial
appropriator. See Trelease and Gould,
Cases and Materials on Water Law, p. 95
(4th Ed. 1986). Supra, § 476.
(1) The rule which states that a
transfer of a water right cannot
injure other (junior) appropriators
is a manifestation of this change.
The rule greatly complicates
transfers, and Professor Joseph Sax
has suggested that the rule is not
sound. Sax draws an analogy to the
lack of legal protection accorded a
restaurant owner whose business is
destroyed when a theatre across the
street is converted into a
warehouse. Sax, Water Law Cases and
Commentary 207 (1965). Once again,
the rule seems justified by
	 ik.,-....,
physical realities. The restaurant
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owner is, or should be, aware that
the way in which his neighbors use
their property might affect his
business and can make an assessment
of the risk this poses at the time
he decides to enter the restaurant
business. The junior appropriator,
on the other hand, frequently cannot
ascertain what portion of the flow
in a stream is natural and what
portion represents return flow from
upstream users; thus, he cannot
cannot assess the risk which a
transfer by an upstream user
poses. The rule protects him
against this risk and, thereby,
encourage full development of the
resource at an early stage, which
may be considered desirable because
of the "flow" nature of the
resource.
b. A basis was laid for the termination of
wasteful uses.
(1) Some economists have suggested that
the prohibition against waste is
unnecessary, arguing that the market
will eliminate waste if water rights
- 13-
are freely salable. See. e. g.,
Milliman, Water Law and Private
Decisionmaking: A Critique, 2 J. Law
& Econ. 41, 50-51 (1959). However,
it does not seem unreasonable if the
state, in giving away water rights
for the first time, asks that one
not make too big a pig of himself.
As to the elimination of waste after
allocation, an argument can be made
that, because of the complex nature
of the water resource, information
and transactions costs may
frequently prevent a market
solution.
3. It should be noted that, while the parameters
of the right are now measured by beneficial
use, typically the permit, license, or
certificate which the appropriator receives
provides no direct information on several of
the more important parameters, such as
consumption and return flows. Again, physical
realities account for this. Consumption and
return flows are difficulty and expensive to
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calculate even today. Typically, they only
become relevant if a change is proposed so it
may have seemed more sensible to determine
them when relevant.
C. Public Ownership and administrative control of
water
1. Beginning with the Colorado Constitution in
1876, all western states have adopted
constitutional or statutory provisions stating
that the waters of the state belong to the
"state," the "public" or the "people."
2. These provisions have generally been construed
as investing the state with "sovereign"
ownership, not "proprietary" ownership. 	 See
Wiel, supra § 172. Most recently, the United
States Supreme Court referred to state
ownership of water as a fiction "'expressive
in legal shorthand of the importance to its
people that a State have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of an important
resource.'" Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 73
L.Ed.2d 1254 (1982), quoting from Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60
L.Ed.2d 250 (1979).
a. Moses Lasky, writing in 1929 argued that
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the intent of the pioneers was to make
the state the owner in a "proprietary"
sense, but that the courts, infused with
common law notions of individual property
rights, construed such provisions to
indicate sovereign ownership. His pithy
statement regarding the rejection of
state ownership and administration of
water in Colorado bears repeating:
"Unfortunately, however, there were
lawyers in Colorado and apparently very
able ones." Lasky, From Prior
Appropriation to Economic Distribution of
Water by the State - Via Irrigation
Administration, 1 Rocky Mountain Law
Review 161 (1929).
3. Whatever their meaning, these provisions
became the basis for the administrative
control of water rights, beginning with
Wyoming in 1890. At the urgings of Elwood
Mead, the Wyoming Constitution and
implementing legislation adopted in that year
created a comprehensive system for the
administrative regulation of water right that
was later emulated, with varying degrees of
modification, by all western states except
Colorado. See 1 Clark, Water and Water
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Rights, pp 105-107 (1967) for a discussion of
the role played by Mead in the creation of the
Wyoming scheme.
4. The administrative regulation of water rights
proceeded rapidly and by 1929 Lasky stated
that the doctrine of prior appropriation had
been replaced by a doctrine of "economic
distribution of water by the state." Although
Lasky's pronouncement that "today prior-
appropriation is the law nowhere in the
West" [Supra, p. 170.7 seems a bit
hyperbolic, it is certainly true that by 1929
prior appropriation was no longer solely a
system of rights enforced only by private
parties.
a. However, while the appropriation system
was no longer self-initiated and self-
regulated, the property rights content of
the doctrine remained. That is, the
state now carved out and granted
individuals property rights which had
essentially the same content as
previously.
5. Consequences:
a. Rights were no longer created "without
permission"; instead a permit or license
from the state was required.
- 17-
b. The state was no longer a mere "umpire",
deciding disputes between private
parties; pursuant to laws directing that
the "public interest" or "public welfare"
be considered, the state began to play an
affirmative role in deciding how its
water resources would be used.
(1) Colorado and Montana are exceptions
to the above. Although the water
courts in Colorado perform many of
the same functions performed by
administrative agencies in other
states, the courts have no
discretionary authority with regard
to water use. A permit system is
now used in Montana, but the agency
administering it does not have
general authority to consider the
public interest in making allocation
decisions.
6. A new chapter in state regulation of water
rights appears to be developing. Partly
because of the view that water rights are
"vested property," most states have not had a
significant discretionary role beyond initial
allocation decisions. This may be changing.
a. California has preserved some discretion
._
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r	 in recent years through the use of a
permit provision giving the Water
Resources Control Board "continuing
authority" to impose additional
conditions to prevent waste and
unreasonable use of water. California
State Water Resources Control Board,
Permit Term No. 12.
b. However, the duties imposed upon the
state by the Mono Lake decision, National 
Audubon Society v. Superior Court of
Alpine County, 33 Ca1.3d 419, 189
Cal.Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709 (1983) mayr
foretell even more significant changes.
In that decision the court held that the
state has "a duty of continuing
supervision over the taking and use of
appropriated water" in order to protect
public trust values. Although water
rights were not involved, several other
western courts have recently invoke the
public trust doctrine in cases involving
water. See, Kootenai Alliance, Inc. v.
Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085
(Idaho 1983), Montana Coalition for
r	 Stream Access Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d
163 (Mont. 1984) and Montana Coalition 
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for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684
P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984).
c. While administrative approval is
generally required before a change in use
can be made in a water right, until
recently the role of the agencies has
largely been ministerial. However,
statutes enacted by Wyoming in 1973, Wyo.
Stat. §41-3-104(A), in California in
1985, § West's California Water Code §
1735, and in New Mexico in 1985, N.M.
Sess. L 1985, Ch. 201, direct
administrative agencies to consider
certain "public" effects when approving
transfer applications.
7. Again, the nature of the water resource
explains the need for extensive state
involvement in the administration of water
rights.
a. Normal judicial procedures proved
ineffective in resolving disputes and
enforcing rights on streams and rivers
with hundreds, or thousands, of water
rights.
b. The discretionary authority given the
state administrator (the authority or
deny or condition permits) is not so
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easily explained, but I believe it is
justified.
(1) Because of the large capital costs
frequently required for water use
and the high information and
transactions costs associated with
--transfers, it is best if water is
initially allocated to its "best"
use, or at least to the "better"
use. Water administrators have
frequently used their discretionary
authority to achieve this, rejecting
one application to use water in
favor of a better one.
(2) More importantly, however,
discretionary authority is a means
of assuring that values not
associated with appropriation
(diversion and consumptive use),
such as aesthetic values,
recreational values, fish and
wildlife values, and environmental
values, receive consideration.
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IV. THE WATER RIGHT
A. From the forgoing, an appropriative water right
might be defined as follows:
1. A perpetual license from the state
2. which is "property"
3. entitling the holder to divert water from a
designated source (stream, river, or lake)
4. at a specified point
5. at a specified rate
6. for a particular purpose
7. at a specified place
8. after the rights of all others holding a prior
licenses to divert water from the source have
been satisfied.
B. Changes may be made in the point of diversion,
place of use, and purpose, but a change may not
significantly alter the pattern and degree of
use.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Much can undoubtedly be done to improve the
efficiency with which water is used in the west.
Nevertheless, discussions of the problem must begin
with a clear understanding of the resource and an
accurate assessment of the law.
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